The Man Who Could Be King

IV. TRIUMPH—THE SECOND CROSSING OF THE DELAWARE

WASHINGTON’S PLEA TO HIS TROOPS, PAGES 113–14

A sergeant present at the plea by Washington to his troops to reenlist before the second crossing of the Delaware recalled the speech in 1832:

My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do, and more than could [be] reasonably expected; but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with the fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty, and to your country, which you probably can never do under any other circumstances. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 272–73.)

Josiah marvels, as can we, that a general would make such an appeal to his troops. Not only was this beyond what a British general at that time would do but, according to Fischer, beyond what any general in the world would have done then.

“An officer asked the general if the men should be enrolled. ‘No,’ said Washington, ‘men who will volunteer in such a case as this, need no enrollment to keep them to their duty’” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 273). In 1776, from the General on down officers in the American army were, to the astonishment of Europeans, addressing privates as gentlemen. Washington made his appeal based not just on rank but on principles of honor and “human dignity and decency.”

That this appeal came from a general who expected and received deference from his troops made the appeal all the more remarkable.

FOREIGNERS’ ESTEEM FOR WASHINGTON’S GENERALSHIP, PAGES 120, 122

While Washington outmaneuvered the plotters in the Conway Cabal, what really solidified both congressional and public opinion behind him was the exalted opinion of Washington’s generalship held by European and British officers and leaders. Congressmen, who, as Lafayette observed, knew nothing about war, may have had occasional doubts about Washington’s generalship, but there were no doubts among either America’s enemies or allies.

In terms of the war, the most crucial opinions came from British officers who came to believe that the war could not be won because Washington was superior to any British general. Josiah refers to the intercepted letters of British officers. Lieutenant Colonel Allan MacLean wrote: “Poor devils as the rebel generals are, they have outgeneraled us more than once, even since I have been here, which is only six weeks . . . Lord Cornwallis is, I believe, a brave man. But he allowed himself to be fairly outgeneraled by Washington, the 4th of January last at Trenton, and missed a glorious opportunity when he let Washington slip away in the night” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 344).

Even British general Clinton recognized Washington’s outgeneraling of Cornwallis: “His Lordship, thinking that Washington would wait for him till the next day, deceived by his fires . . . into this belief, neglects to patrole to Allentown—over which Washington’s whole army and the last hope of America escaped” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 344). The same was true of the Hessian officers who convened a court-martial to find out why they had inferior leadership.

The British government in London tried to suppress the news of the American victories at Trenton and Princeton, which of course just made that news all the more devastating when it came out. Realizing that the British had huge advantages over the Americans in numbers, training, experience, and arms, British writers drew what to them was the obvious conclusion: the only way the Americans could be winning was that Washington was a superior general and that generals such as Clinton just could not match Washington when it came to the “abilities to plan [and] . . . to execute” (John Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 358).

While the British and Hessians may have criticized themselves and each other as well as crediting Washington, other Europeans just hailed Washington’s generalship. Josiah accurately quotes the French general Rochambeau as well as Frederick the Great, who, after the victories at Trenton and Princeton, extolled Washington:

The achievements of Washington and his little band of compatriots between the 25th of December and the 4th of January, a space of ten days, were the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military achievements. (See Ron Chernow, George Washington, 283.)

Similarly, Horace Walpole compared Washington’s exploits to those of the Roman general Fabius. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 324.)

Cornwallis himself, who most Americans recognized as Britain’s finest general in the war (and whose talents were later recognized by British kings over decades and many continents), acknowledged the emergence of Washington’s superior generalship not just at Yorktown but earlier, in the Delaware campaigns. Cornwallis did so at a dinner with Washington after he surrendered to Washington at Yorktown in 1781. That generals would gather right after a decisive battle for a drink and dinner may seem quaint today. We can’t imagine Eisenhower exchanging toasts with a German general. Yet that is what happened after Yorktown, when Josiah accurately quotes Cornwallis’s toast to Washington:

When the illustrious part that your Excellency has borne in this long and arduous contest becomes a matter of history, fame will gather your brightest laurels rather from the banks of the Delaware than from those of the Chesapeake. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 362.)

V. VICTORY AT YORKTOWN

FOREIGNERS’ ESTEEM FOR WASHINGTON’S GENERALSHIP (CONT.), PAGES 125, 127

As happens so often, a hero is recognized sooner by those more distant than by those closer to home. In this case, those at home quickly fell in line with the opinions of those abroad. Benjamin Franklin was surrounded and influenced by French, Dutch, Russian, and Prussian generals. Franklin conveyed their sentiments to the Congress back home. Thus, while some in Congress or a few rival generals may have carped, Franklin felt very confident in expressing to an English friend what he believed to be an accepted European opinion on how five British generals—Gage, Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, and Carleton—had all fallen victim to Washington:

An American planter was chosen by us to command our troops and continued during the whole war. This man sent home to you, one after another, five of your best generals, baffled, their heads bare of laurels, disgraced even in the opinion of their employers. (See Ron Chernow, George Washington, 458.)

Franklin knew that his opinion was accepted European opinion and that his English friend would not disagree with him.

CHAPTER FIVE: DAY FIVE, FRIDAY—FINAL PREPARATIONS

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