Some modern historians think that if Washington really believed in freeing his slaves, he would have done so sooner. Again, we are confronted with the question of what standard you use to judge a historical figure, the standard of his own times or ours. Yes, Washington only freed his slaves after his death, but I am not aware of any other Virginia planter who freed his slaves in his will in 1799.
Other Founding Fathers, such as Franklin and Hamilton, were abolitionists, but they were not born into slaveholding families with large numbers of slaves. Other Founding Fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, were born in similar slaveholding circumstances as Washington but refused to free their slaves. Henry Wiencek’s article “Master of Monticello” brings out the differences in how these two Founding Fathers treated their slaves, including how Jefferson turned down a gift in 1817 from the Polish noblemen Tadeusz Kosciuszko (the equivalent of $280,000 in today’s dollars) to free his slaves. Wiencek shows how Washington, in his last will and testament, rebuked his era and showed “that if you claim to have principles, you must live by them” (Smithsonian magazine, October 2012). To the complaint of those historians who wish Washington had been more public in his opposition to slavery, Washington’s last will and testament certainly attracted public notice. Abolitionist groups held their annual meetings in the early 1800s on Washington’s birthday. They, like the black poet Phillis Wheatley, and many others, had no doubt where Washington stood.
Why Washington evolved from slaveholder to abolitionist is not totally clear. Josiah would probably say that, while moral and economic factors played a role, Washington, as usual, had his eye on history and what later Americans would think of him. But as Josiah would also likely observe, if one does the right thing, what difference do the reasons make?
CHAPTER FOUR: DAY FOUR, THURSDAY—COUNCILS OF WAR, REFLECTIONS ON GENERALSHIP
CONSPIRACIES AGAINST WASHINGTON, PAGES 81-84
Looking back, it is hard for us to imagine that other generals and political leaders wanted to replace Washington. We must remember that Congress appointed many of the top generals so that almost every major general had the support of a congressional faction. Further, the war stretched on for over seven years, and in such a lengthy struggle there were ups and downs. One of the most depressing periods was after the defeat in New York and during the retreat across New Jersey. With thousands pledging allegiance to the king at that time, as Josiah notes, it was only natural that many should seek new leadership. Josiah comments on Generals Lee and Gates wanting to replace Washington, and there were probably others who harbored similar ambitions.
The so-called Conway Cabal was the best known of these conspiracies. It reached fruition in 1777 during the encampment at Valley Forge. There were three leading characters: General Thomas Conway, an Irish-born French general seeking fortune and promotion in the French army, who received his appointment from Congress and was the organizer of the effort; General Thomas Mifflin, the quartermaster general under fire for corruption and incompetence; and General Horatio Gates, the victor at the Battle of Saratoga, whose role was more ambiguous. The creation of an independent Board of War, which was chaired by Gates and had Mifflin as a member, and the appointment of Conway as the army’s inspector general were the tools for replacing Washington with Gates or Mifflin, but a trail of letters and comments exalting Gates and demeaning Washington undermined the plotters’ efforts. A letter from Conway to Gates fell into Washington’s hands with incriminating language, and it soon circulated: “Heaven has been determined to save your [Gates’s] country, or a weak General [Washington] and bad counsellors would have ruined it” (Douglas Freeman, George Washington, vol. 4, 593).
Impatient members of Congress, particularly the newer delegates, were receptive to criticism of Washington for not ending the war quickly. Eventually, however, Washington’s supporters rallied to his defense. His practice of appointing officers on the basis of merit served him well as scores of officers from many states petitioned Congress against appointing Conway, a French major general, over American officers with greater experience and qualifications. Lafayette implicitly threatened Congress to cut off French aid and wrote Washington that “stupid men . . . without knowing a single word about war, undertake to judge you, to make ridiculous comparisons; they are infatuated with Gates” (Ron Chernow, George Washington, 316).
A committee of the Congress visited Valley Forge and gained appreciation for Washington’s strategy for outlasting the British. The president of the Congress, Henry Laurens (who just happened to be the father of Washington’s aide John Laurens), and luminaries like Patrick Henry stepped forth. Finally, the troops made their wishes known. As one observer noted, their views were clear: “The toast among the soldiers, Washington or no Army” (Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington, vol. 4, 606).
Ultimately, Conway overplayed his hand, threatening to resign so many times that Congress eventually took him up on his offer. Mifflin also resigned while Gates hastened to disavow his role. Washington, meanwhile, remained calm and dignified, letting others wage the fight. Eventually Conway ended up in a duel with one of Washington’s aides, John Cadwalader. After being severely wounded, and before returning to France, a beaten and humiliated Conway wrote an apology to Washington:
I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done, written, or said anything disagreeable to your Excellency. My career will soon be over. Therefore justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and the good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these states whose liberties you have asserted by your virtues. (See Ron Chernow, George Washington, 322.)
No one in the ranks or in Congress ever challenged Washington’s authority again. In Henry Laurens’s words, this saved the revolutionary effort from “ruin.” It also left Washington so triumphant that many wondered what he would decide coming out of that week in Newburgh five years later.
(For those interested in reading more about the Conway Cabal, see Douglas S. Freeman, George Washington, vol. 4, pages 586–612; Ron Chernow, George Washington, pages 316–22; and James Flexner, Washington, The Indispensable Man, pages 111–16.)