“You need to think long and hard before you make that decision,” Graham said. “Because when you make that decision, it is hard to go back. The day you do that is the day you rock the South Korean stock market and the Japanese economy. That is a big frigging deal.”
“You think I should wait?” Trump asked.
“Mr. President,” Graham said, “I don’t think you should ever start this process unless you’re ready to go to war.”
Trump had stayed his Twitter finger for the moment, but the issue of U.S. military dependents in South Korea did not go away. The U.S. military, however, continued to send dependents to South Korea.
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37
General Kelly informed the president that his two top foreign policy advisers, McMaster and Tillerson, were in a ferocious fight over who would negotiate with Saudi Arabia to get $4 billion. The money was in part to fund operations in Syria, including a top secret CIA project for the Syrian rebels code-named TEAK.
Getting foreign governments to fund U.S. military and CIA operations in foreign countries remained one of Trump’s biggest goals. Damn H.R., Trump said. This pointy-head academic has no sense of business or how to negotiate.
Kelly agreed, McMaster was not the guy for the job and so far had not been very successful with the Saudis. They were often willing to write big checks for a variety of projects in Syria. According to Tillerson, McMaster had stepped in and said, “I’m reaching out to my counterparts in Saudi. I’m going to negotiate directly with them.”
The president was furious. Even with a multitude of problems with Tillerson, at least he had experience cutting deals with the Saudi royal family for years as the Exxon CEO. Tillerson also knew the Saudis could not be trusted and for Trump, not trusting the people on the other side of the table was a first principle of haggling, of beating them down to get a better bargain. You had to be tough and say no to get to yes. Why the hell would McMaster take this away from Tillerson? It doesn’t make any sense, he said.
But there was a more pressing matter that day, January 19, 2018, one day short of Trump’s first full year.
In several secure phone conversations with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, Trump had intensified his criticism of the KORUS trade agreement between the two countries. He would not let go of the $18 billion trade deficit and the $3.5 billion expense of stationing 28,500 U.S. troops. The refrain was jeopardizing relations with Moon, whom he disliked. Trump’s obsessive and unfiltered venting had brought him to the edge once again.
Trump told Moon he wanted to send a 180-day termination letter and destroy the trade relationship.
You guys are ripping us off, he said. He wanted the trade and security issues separated. I’m done just giving you guys free money!
Moon replied that trade and security were intertwined. We want to work with you, the South Korean president said. He was conciliatory. You’re one of our allies, one of our partners. There may be some misunderstanding about the economic relationship. We want to come to an understanding.
Trump was amped up. You’ve got to pay for the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system. Why do we need to have any of our anti-ballistic system there?
He belittled the KORUS trade agreement, South Korea and its new leader. This barely concealed rage at an ally was magnificently undiplomatic, the way the president often liked it. He was on the verge of blowing up the relationship.
Kelly, McMaster, Tillerson and Mattis joked darkly that it was inexplicable that the president was voicing more ire at South Korea than our adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, Syria and North Korea.
The senior White House staff and national security team were appalled. They didn’t know what the president might say or do. This was an important relationship, especially at that moment. They had to shut this down. There was a consensus that something needed to be done before Moon decided he’d had enough.
McMaster set up a National Security Council meeting in the Situation Room for January 19, 2018. The meeting was billed as a discussion of issues related to South Korea among the president and the principals—Tillerson, Mattis, Kelly, McMaster, Dunford, Cohn.
Trump got right to his point. “What do we get by maintaining a massive military presence in the Korean Peninsula?” he asked, returning to his obsession with the money and the troops.
“And even more than that,” he went on, “what do we get from protecting Taiwan, say?” He had always seen this as a worldwide problem: the United States paying for the defense of others in Asia, the Middle East and NATO. Why are we even friends with South Korea? he wanted to know. What do we get out of this? He had been fuming for a year. The answers were insufficient.
Mattis and General Dunford once more explained that the benefit was immense. We get a stable democracy in a part of the world where we really need it, Mattis said. South Korea was one of the strongest bastions—free elections and a vibrant capitalism.
South Korea had a population of 50 million people, the 27th-largest country in the world but with an economy that was the 11th-largest and a GDP of $1.5 trillion, the same as Russia’s.
Trump had been informed about the edge the Special Access Program intelligence operations gave the United States in detecting a North Korean missile launch—seven seconds versus 15 minutes from Alaska. There was also an offensive cyber attack capability. It had mixed results sabotaging North Korean missiles before or after launch.
Mattis showed signs that he was tired of the disparaging of the military and intelligence capability. And of Trump’s unwillingness to comprehend their significance.
“We’re doing this in order to prevent World War III,” Mattis said. He was calm but stark. It was a breathtaking statement, a challenge to the president, suggesting he was risking nuclear war. Time stopped for more than one in attendance.
One person present said Mattis’s message was clear: Stop fucking around with this. We’re doing this because we’ve got to prevent World War III. This isn’t some business gamble where if you happen to go bankrupt or whatever, it’s not a big deal.
It seemed Mattis and others were at the end of their rope with the president. How are you possibly questioning these things that are obvious and so fundamental? It was as if Mattis were saying, God, stop it!
Mattis was not finished. “We have the ability to defend the homeland with forward deployment” of the 28,500 troops. He was reluctant to mention the Special Access Programs in such a large meeting.
Mattis explained, without the intelligence capability and the troops, the risk of war would vastly increase. The means of defending South Korea and Japan would be decreased. If there was a war without these assets, “The only option left is the nuclear option. We can’t achieve the same deterrent effect” in any other way. “And we can’t do it as cost effectively.” The arrangement with South Korea was one of the great national security bargains of all time. Mattis tried to speak the president’s language of cost/benefit analysis.
“But we’re losing so much money in trade with South Korea, China and others,” Trump countered. “I’d rather be spending money on our own country.” The United States was subsidizing others with the trade imbalances.
“Other countries,” Trump went on, “who’ve agreed to do security things for us only do it because they’re taking so much of our money.” They were almost stealing from us.
“Forward-positioned troops provide the least costly means of achieving our security objectives, and withdrawal would lead our allies to lose all confidence in us,” Mattis replied.
Chairman Dunford jumped in, seconding all these points with some passion.
“We’re spending massive amounts for very rich countries who aren’t burden sharing,” Trump said, hammering his point.