When the next attack came, a few miles away at Pell’s Point, a Massachusetts brigade under Colonel John Glover retreated in good order, inflicting heavy losses. The brigade, one of our best outfits, was made up of New England fishermen, Negroes, and Indians. As superior British forces advanced, our first line of defense would rise and fire into the British ranks. As the British drew their feared bayonets for a charge, our first line swiftly retreated behind a second line. The next line then rose with the British approach and fired before retreating, while reloading, behind a third line. In this manner, an orderly retreat was maintained while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. While these tactics were later widely used by our forces and attributed to the General (although he never claimed authorship), I know they were initiated that day by Colonel Glover at Pell’s Point. The General embraced and used these tactics for the rest of the war against more numerous advancing enemy forces, although I suppose he deserves some credit for knowing how to adapt.
The General moved his forces across the Hudson to retreat through New Jersey, but not before we watched the saddest defeat and biggest indictment of the General’s leadership in the whole war. Fort Washington on the northern tip of the island was still manned by over a thousand Americans. The General decided to withdraw those troops to join the main force in New Jersey, but at a council of his generals, he allowed General Greene, who was later to distinguish himself as one of our ablest generals, to convince him to leave the fort occupied. The argument was that the fort was impregnable and was tying up large numbers of British and Hessian troops. The General acceded, and I do believe that, although he called many councils of war in the future, he never again allowed such a council to override one of his strong instincts. Loyalists, of whom there were many in New York, showed the British how to attack the fort, and our forces, outnumbered by over four to one, after fighting valiantly, surrendered. Surrender did not save many of our survivors, who were then bayoneted by the Hessians, outraged by their losses in the previous days. All of this the General saw by telescope from the Jersey shore. It was the only time I saw tears come to his eyes. The General refrained from blaming others and cursed himself for making a horrendous mistake, which it certainly was. He also took full responsibility, which was great fodder for his critics.
Some of the General’s critics, especially General Charles Lee, started spreading the word that the General was “indecisive” and implied he should be replaced, presumably by Lee. But the critics were not among the ranks. The soldiers adored the General for his willingness to take the same risks they did in facing enemy fire. Perhaps they also realized that five of the hundreds of British frigates in New York waters had more firepower than all the American guns on shore and that their British and Hessian opponents were better fed, better clothed, and better trained, and outnumbered our men by over three to one. I have since learned that the average British private had fifteen years’ service, while our men had, in many cases, only served months.
Nonetheless, the General’s reputation, which had been so strong after Boston, had now sunk to where his critics in Congress and elsewhere were emboldened. The General, as always sensitive to public opinion, was well aware of all this. I drafted a letter to his cousin Lund at Mount Vernon saying that he was never so unhappy and that he was tempted to resign but that many were telling him that “if I leave the service, all will be lost.”
The General mused to me that the challenge was to match our strategy to the strength of our troops, and he believed that New York had provided the necessary lessons. Never again would he defend major cities where the British controlled surrounding waters. And never again would he ask his men to defend points, no matter how well fortified, when the odds were long. “Josiah,” he said wryly, “the honor of making a brave defense does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the success is very doubtful and falling into the enemy’s hands probable.” Rather, the General intended, no matter what the advice of Congress or other generals, to adopt a strategy of retreating before the superior British and Hessian forces, exacting a cost where possible, and launching surprise attacks where circumstances showed the probability of a favorable outcome. While he called frequent councils of war on tactics, I never saw the General deviate from that strategy.
As we retreated across New Jersey that chilly November, the critics’ voices grew louder. The British crossed the Hudson after us, capturing supplies and weapons. Congressmen, openly, and Generals Lee and Gates, behind his back, asked why the General did not stand and fight. But the General followed his strategy, and while I had my doubts at the time, it proved to be correct. How did these critics expect the General, with two thousand men—there were many desertions—to stop the ten thousand British and Hessians occupying New Jersey towns? Of course, if you counted all the Americans under arms, including the armies commanded by generals appointed by Congress such as Heath, Lee, and Gates, as well as the militia in twelve states, the British numerical superiority largely disappeared. But the other generals kept their forces in New York, New England, and the uncontested part of New Jersey and, counting on the loyalty of friendly congressmen, refused to join our forces. And what good did a thousand militia in North Carolina or any other state do to help us in New Jersey?
We retreated across New Jersey with the British and Hessian troops in pursuit. Our numbers grew smaller—the desertions and expiring enlistments vastly outnumbered new recruits. It was amazing to me how the spirit of freedom seemed to ebb as the prospects for victory diminished. At the same time, however, with smaller numbers, our professionalism was rising. General William Howe’s strategy seemed to be to deliberately occupy New Jersey as he had New York City, while his brother, Admiral Richard Howe, occupied Newport and the surrounding parts of Rhode Island.
I found our retreat and the British occupation of New Jersey in the fall of 1776 the most demoralizing time in the war. At least three thousand (and some said as many as ten thousand) citizens in New Jersey pledged allegiance to the king. Why, even one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Richard Stockton, did so. In many towns, the British were welcomed and dined. General Howe thought that, if the British occupied another key state, the resistance would be broken, and the majority of Americans, who he believed loyal to the crown, would rise up and take control of their towns. While the citizens defecting were many, in our largely middle-class country, it seemed to me the defectors were mostly rich or poor.