Many Ghanaians praised Malcolm for questioning the State Department’s claims about racial progress in America. His message echoed throughout Africa at a time when the United States’ image abroad suffered from civil rights protests. As the movement escalated during the early 1960s, international news coverage of brutal discrimination against blacks took on increased significance as the United States and the Soviet Union fought over the alignment of African countries. Appealing to African leaders, the United States promoted a narrative of color-blind democracy in America, while international correspondents and photographers told a different story. In the aftermath of the Birmingham crisis, images of police dogs and fire hoses unleashed on black children were published across Africa. In Accra, the US embassy reported that the American government took “a heavy beating in Ghana over Birmingham.” And after the March on Washington, a small group of Ghanaian protestors demonstrated outside the American embassy, carrying placards that read, “America, Africa is Watching You.”24
In the mid-1950s, Kwame Nkrumah was celebrated as a symbol of hope throughout the continent. Since 1957, when Ghana became the first sub-Saharan state to gain independence from colonial rule, Nkrumah’s promise of democracy had gradually deteriorated into an authoritarian regime plagued by rigged elections, mass arrests, new taxes, and prison sentences for criticizing the government. Yet during the Kennedy administration, the United States courted Nkrumah, hoping that the president’s charisma would persuade him to ignore the Soviet Union’s overtures.25
But Nkrumah’s mercurial personality made him unpredictable. Dependent on foreign investment, the Ghanaian government exploited the superpowers for financial aid. Still, Nkrumah harbored fears that the CIA, acting independently of the American government, was out to get him, a fear exacerbated by two assassination attempts against him. He also suspected that some black expatriates were working as foreign agents.
In February 1964, about a month after Nkrumah survived a second attempt on his life, two hundred workers from his Convention People’s Party staged a protest outside the American embassy, shouting, “Yankees, go home!” A few days later, protestors lowered the American flag in front of the embassy. The state’s official newspaper, the Ghanaian Times, accused the US of plotting against Nkrumah “because he is the biggest thorn in their neocolonialist ambitions, [and] because he is forging the path of Socialism.” In response, Undersecretary of State W. Averell Harriman warned Nkrumah that if his government continued to criticize America, the United States would suspend funding for the Volta River hydroelectric dam project, the centerpiece of Ghana’s industrialization.26
By the time Malcolm and Ali arrived in May, Nkrumah had expressed regret over the embassy protests, instructing all government media to cease disseminating anti-American propaganda. After Malcolm reached Accra, he asked Mayfield if he could arrange a meeting with the president, but the Ghanaian leader hesitated after US ambassador William Mahoney warned him that Malcolm’s inflammatory rhetoric might damage the goodwill between their countries. Nkrumah made sure that as long as Malcolm, and Ali for that matter, were in Ghana, neither man would jeopardize his relationship with the United States. In Accra, American diplomats reported, “anti-American statements . . . by Malcolm X, militant former Black Muslim leader, and Cassius Clay . . . had received little attention in the press.”27
Nkrumah well understood the risks of engaging Malcolm. Having met him at a Harlem rally in 1960, he was aware of the minister’s provocative image. Only after W. E. B. Du Bois’s widow, Shirley, appealed to Nkrumah on Malcolm’s behalf did he consent to a private meeting at the Christiansborg Castle, an old slave fort.28
On May 15, at about noon, Julian Mayfield dropped Malcolm off outside the castle. After guards patted Malcolm down, Nkrumah, a slight man, rose from behind his large office desk, offering a firm handshake and a warm smile. For about an hour they sat on a couch, discussing the plight of black Americans and the importance of Pan-Africanism. If Malcolm asked Nkrumah to support a UN resolution charging the United States with human rights violations, he left disappointed. The Ghanaian leader may have sympathized with his cause, but politics prevented him from considering such a proposal.29
Initially, the State Department viewed Malcolm’s journey abroad as a threat to American foreign policy. If he’d convinced just one African nation to charge the US with human rights violations, he could have damaged America’s international reputation. In the end, though, the State Department concluded that Malcolm lacked political leverage with the officials he met. He had nothing tangible to offer—no bridges, no dams, no money. The fact that he did not receive “an official endorsement” from Nkrumah minimized “his impact.” “All in all,” American officials surmised, “Malcolm X created less of a stir than the Embassy feared.”30
Yet Malcolm’s experience in Ghana deepened his commitment to Pan-Africanism. Talking with Africans who expressed a sincere interest in the struggle of African Americans convinced him that they all shared a common struggle against racial oppression. He left Ghana inspired. If there was a single lesson that he learned, it was that “our problems were their problems. We are all one people—Africans or of African descent. We are all blood brothers!”31