Fear: Trump in the White House

The process was precisely what Bannon hated. He saw it as tilted toward military action, toughness, with a momentum and concept of its own: America as the world’s policeman. Do something, became the mantra; fix it. They hadn’t even answered Trump’s question about exactly what the United States was doing with its large presence in the Middle East.

Bannon saw Ivanka’s hand at work. She knew how to work her father better than anyone. She took pictures of the suffering or dead babies to him in the residence. The gas attack was a true horror, Bannon understood, but a military response was exactly what Trump should not want.

In sharp contrast, Derek Harvey was tired of being involved in managing national security policy to inconclusive results. Syria was a classic case study of words and half measures almost designed not to solve the problem. This was a chance to maximize a military response.

The middle option called for a strike of about 60 Tomahawks at one airfield.

“We have an opportunity here to do more,” Harvey argued to McMaster, “and we have to think in terms of hitting multiple airfields.” They could strike with real impact. “Take out their air power because that’s a force multiplier for the regime. We’re trying to shape the endgame and put more pressure on the regime to engage politically.”

Harvey said they should “take out his air force—not 15 or 20 percent, let’s take out 80 percent of it.” That would mean using 200 Tomahawks, more than triple the 60 from the middle option.

“Derek, I know,” McMaster said, “but we’ve got to deal with the reality of Mattis” who “is berating me for the direction we are heading here.”

Mattis wanted to be careful. Action in any form was risky. Russians were working at the Syrian airfields; kill Russians, and they would have a whole new ball game, a confrontation or a catastrophe.

A National Security Council meeting was scheduled to discuss options. Bannon availed himself of his walk-in privileges and went to see Trump alone in the Oval Office. He told the president that part of avoiding unnecessary wars and overseas commitments was not responding with missiles the way his advisers were proposing.

Jump in and make sure you are vocal, Trump said.

In a public statement on April 4, Trump attacked both Assad and Obama. “These heinous actions by the Bashar al-Assad regime are a consequence of the past administration’s weakness and irresolution. President Obama said in 2012 that he would establish a ‘red line’ against the use of chemical weapons and then did nothing.”

At the NSC meeting, the three options were presented: hot, medium and cold. The largest option was a 200-missile attack on all the major Syrian airfields; the medium option was 60 missiles; and the smallest was almost none, or none at all.

The potential target list was large. In 2013 when Obama had threatened a missile attack, he had approved a target list including a government compound housing the chemical weapons program. It didn’t make the current target list because Mattis and the Pentagon wanted to keep the attack as narrow as possible.

Mattis had scoped it down just to the one airfield in the 60-missile strike. A housing complex at the airfield was also taken off the target list because of the likelihood that family members would be there.

“If that’s the standard,” Bannon argued, “let me go get some pictures of sub-Saharan Africa. Okay? Let me get some of what’s happening down in Guatemala and Nicaragua. If this is the standard for a fucking missile strike, let’s go everywhere. Let’s do everything.” He thought he had the president on his side.

“This will be another pinprick,” Bannon continued. If they were going to strike, do something dramatic, he added sarcastically. “This is very Clinton-esque,” he said, deploying the biggest insult. “You’re going to drop a couple of cruise missiles onto a runway that will be fully back up and operational in a day or two.”

But then the middle option advocates worked the president. Bannon thought it was insidious. Their argument was that this was not designed to start a war. It was really a messaging operation, designed to avoid one.

On Friday, Trump flew to Mar-a-Lago and in the evening convened an NSC meeting in a SCIF. Fourteen people were there—Tillerson, Priebus, McMaster, Kushner, Bannon, Cohn and Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategy Dina Powell. Mattis was on the video screen. The middle option of 60 sea-launched missiles was on the table. The targets were Syrian aircraft on the ground, hardened aircraft shelters, storage facilities for petroleum and other material, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems and radar.

Trump had stepped back from his initial desire to kill Assad. He was unusually focused on the details. He had a series of questions about risk. What happens if a missile or missiles go off course? What happens if we hit a school? If we hit a hospital? Or a target we did not intend to hit? What was the possibility of killing civilians?

Mattis provided assurances. These were the best ships and men.

Trump asked to talk on a secure line with the captains of the two ships, the USS Porter and the USS Ross, both guided missile destroyers. He told the skippers: I’m going ahead with this strike tonight. Are your guys the best at programming the missiles?

Both captains gave assurances. Trump then went around the room and asked each for an opinion. What do you think? If anyone here has a second opinion, I want to hear it here, not later.

There was agreement, even strong support.

Intelligence showed convincingly that the Russians would be in just one compound at the airfield. The timing of the strike—4:40 a.m. in Syria—virtually ensured they would not be working around the aircraft. About 15 minutes before the Tomahawks would hit, a warning was sent to the Russians at the airfield. When the call was made, the Russian who picked up the phone at the airfield sounded intoxicated.

Trump gave the go-ahead for his first significant military action. Fifty-nine Tomahawks hit their targets; one fell into the Mediterranean after launch.

Trump went to dinner with Chinese president Xi Jinping, who was visiting Mar-a-Lago as part of a two-day summit to discuss trade and North Korea. As dessert was being served Trump said to Xi, “We’re in the process of bombing Syria because of its gas attack.”

“Say that again,” Xi said through the interpreter. Trump repeated it.

“How many missiles?” Xi asked.

Trump said 59.

“59?” Xi asked.

Trump confirmed 59.

“Okay,” Xi said, “I understand. Good, he deserved it.”

And that was the end of the dinner.

Afterward, Bannon called Harvey a “warmonger. You and H.R. are trying to start a war.”



* * *



About midnight, Trump called Senator Lindsey Graham.

“Did I wake you up?” Trump asked.

“Yeah,” Graham said.

“Sorry.”

“No, I’m glad to hear from you, Mr. President.”

“I bet you are the happiest guy in town.”

“Happy is not the right word. I’m proud of my president.” Graham could hear a pin drop. “You did something that should have been done a long time ago.”

“A hundred countries have called,” Trump said.

Graham thought, probably, maybe, 10.

“They’re all calling me, patting me on the back. You know what the Chinese president told me? When I told him during dessert, we just shot 59 Tomahawks at Assad? Good, he deserved it!”

A blow to the Bannon model! Graham thought.

“Obama,” Trump said, “he’s a weak dick. He would’ve never done that.”

“And his failure to do that has cost about 400,000 people their lives,” Graham said, pointing to the number who had died in the entire Syrian war.

Trump kept talking about the kids—burnt, peeling skin, horrifying deaths and injuries.

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