In February, General Dunford stopped by the office of Senator Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican, for a private talk.
Probably few in the Senate worked harder on military matters than Graham. A bachelor and colonel in the Air Force reserve, he seemed always on duty. He had built a vast bipartisan network in Washington. Former vice president Joe Biden, who had served 36 years in the Senate, said that Graham had the “best instincts” of anyone in the upper chamber. Graham, 61, a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was best friend and virtual permanent sidekick to the committee’s chairman, the outspoken Senator John McCain.
When Dunford arrived at Graham’s office, Graham could see that the chairman was shaken. Trump was asking for a new war plan for a preemptive military strike on North Korea, Dunford confided.
The intelligence on North Korea was not good enough, Dunford said. “We need better intelligence before I give the president a plan.”
A Marine and combat veteran and former commandant of the Marine Corps, Dunford had served as commander of the 5th Marine Regiment during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. His nickname was “Fighting Joe” and he had served under then Major General James Mattis. He was clearly rattled by Trump’s impulsive decision-making style. Graham sensed that Dunford was stalling Trump’s request given the risk.
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Graham had a contentious relationship with Trump during the primaries. One of 16 besides Trump running for the Republican nomination, Graham had not made it past the second tier. He’d called Trump a “jackass,” and in retaliation Trump gave out his cell phone number at a campaign rally in South Carolina, flooding his phone with so many calls that Graham destroyed it in a comic video. He endorsed Jeb Bush, contrasting him to Trump: Bush “hasn’t tried to get ahead in a contested primary by throwing dangerous rhetoric around.”
Priebus urged Graham to build a relationship with Trump. One of the selling points, he told Graham: “You’re a lot of fun. He needs fun people around him.”
Graham was pounding Trump pretty hard, especially on the first executive order, on the Muslim ban. “Some third grader wrote it on the back of an envelope,” he said.
Graham and McCain had released a joint statement: “We fear this executive order will become a self-inflicted wound in the fight against terrorism. This executive order sends a signal, intended or not, that America does not want Muslims coming into our country. That is why we fear this executive order may do more to help terrorist recruitment than improve our security.”
Graham was now willing to put the past behind.
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Several weeks later, on March 7, Trump invited Graham to lunch at the White House. Graham had prepared a little speech.
When he walked into the Oval Office, Trump was sitting behind the Resolute Desk. He jumped up, moved swiftly toward Graham, and gave him a big hug. “We’ve got to be friends,” Trump said. “You’re going to be my friend.”
“Yes, sir,” Graham replied. “I want to be your friend.”
Trump said he shouldn’t have publicly given out Graham’s cell phone number.
“That was the highlight of my campaign,” Graham joked.
“What’s your new number?” Trump asked. He wrote it down, laughed and asked how their rift had occurred.
“It was a contest,” Graham said. “You know I never got any traction. I couldn’t get on the big stage. Now you won. I’m humbled by being beat, and I accept your victory.” He knew this was what Trump wanted to hear. “Do you want me to help you?”
Trump said he did.
“Before we go into lunch,” Graham said, “I want to apologize to you for a very fucked-up Republican majority. Congress is going to fuck up your presidency. We have no idea what we’re doing. We have no plan for health care. We’re on different planets when it comes to cutting taxes. And you’re the biggest loser in this.” Tax reform and a replacement for Obamacare should have been done years ago. “Now you’re the one who can do it. You’re a deal maker. These leaders in Congress don’t know how to do something as simple as buying a house. If there was ever a time for a deal maker, this is it. There are a lot of good people, but most of them never made a deal in the private sector. There are not five people on Capitol Hill I’d let buy me a car. I’d let you buy me a car. And here’s what I want to convince you of: that you’d let me buy you a car.”
They went into the adjoining dining room. The large TV screen was tuned to the Fox cable channel with the sound off. McMaster and Priebus joined them.
“What’s on your mind?” Trump asked.
“Short term, North Korea,” Graham said. “There’ll come a day when somebody’s going to come in and say, ‘Mr. President, they’re on the verge of getting a missile. They’ve miniaturized a nuclear weapon to put on it. They can hit the homeland. What do you want us to do?’?”
Suddenly everyone’s attention was drawn to four North Korean missiles shooting across the giant TV screen. Just days before, on March 5, North Korea had fired four missiles into the Sea of Japan.
Trump’s eyes were as big as silver dollars.
“That’s old footage, old footage,” Graham said, trying to calm everyone. He had seen it before.
“I’ve got to do something about this,” Trump said, pointing to the screen.
“That day is coming,” Graham said. “What are you going to do about it?”
“What do you think I should do about it?” he asked.
“You can accept they’ve got a missile and tell them and China that if you ever use it, that’s the end of North Korea,” Graham said. “And have a missile defense system that has a high percentage of knocking it down. That’s scenario one. Scenario two is that you tell China that we’re not going to let them get such a missile to hit our homeland. And if you don’t take care of it, I will.”
“What would you do?” the president asked.
It had to be the second option, Graham said. You can’t let them have that capability. Number one is too risky.
The president leaned toward McMaster. “What do you think?”
“I think he’s right,” the national security adviser said.
“If it gets to be a mature threat,” Graham said, “don’t let us [Congress] just sit on the sidelines and bitch and moan. If you had the evidence, the day that they come in and tell you that, you call the congressional leadership up and say, I may have to use force here. Let me tell you why I want your backing for authorization to use force against North Korea. If we had a vote that was decisive and you had that authority in your back pocket, it may prevent you from having to use it.”
“That’d be very provocative,” Priebus said.
“It’s meant to be provocative,” Graham replied. “You only do that as a last resort.”
“That will get everyone worried and excited,” Priebus said.
“I don’t give a shit who I make nervous,” Trump said.
“You don’t want it on your résumé that North Korea, a nuclear power, got a missile that could reach the United States on your watch,” Graham said.
Trump said he had been thinking about that.
“If they have a breakout,” Graham said, “and have a missile that will reach the United States, you’ve got to whack them. If you get congressional authorization, you’ve got something in your back pocket.” It would be an intermediate step and would give Trump leverage.
“They think if they get a missile with a nuclear weapon on top, they’re home free. You’ve got to convince them if they try to get a missile with a weapon on top, that’s the end of them.”
McMaster said that the intelligence on North Korea was incomplete.
“Call me before you shoot,” Graham told them.
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